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Abstract
Projects are inherently uncertain and face unexpected events, from small changes in scope to
unforeseen client’s bankruptcy. This paper studies how project managers respond to such
events and how successful and unsuccessful responses differ from the perspective of the
practitioner. We analysed 44 unexpected events faced by 22 experienced project managers in
defence and defence-related organisations. The project managers compared two unexpected
events that they faced, one that they considered the response successful and the other,
unsuccessful. We identified three pillars supporting successful responses to unexpected events: (1)
responsive and functioning structure at the organizational level, (2) good interpersonal
relationship at the group level and (3) competent people at the individual level. The events and
respective responses analysed suggest that improvement in project management can be achieved
by better managing these three pillars, allowing project and programme managers to “create
their own luck”.
Keywords: Unexpected events, perceived success, organizational response, project management
1 Introduction 
 
The Titanic had an image of perfection.  The project to design and build the largest and most ro-
bust passenger-liner in the world received much attention and admiration as an engineering feat.  
However the benefit realisation of the project is arguable.  The superlatives sunk with the ship on 
its maiden voyage in 14
th
 April 1912.  The unexpected event – hitting an iceberg – could actually 
have been expected and avoided, yet probably considered unlikely to happen given its massive 
and sturdy structure.  It emerged subsequently that the resources necessary to cope with the crisis 
were not available, which worsened the consequences of the unexpected event significantly. 
 
As projects are inherently uncertain, they are prone to unexpected events (De Meyer et al., 2002; 
Huchzermeier and Loch, 2001; Sun and Meng, 2008), i.e. events that may have been predicted 
(or not), but are not expected to happen.  When they happen, they can have a considerable impact 
in the project.  Yet project management mainstream literature responds to this reality in a rational 
and deterministic way, opting for a routine-based reliability to eliminate situated human condi-
tion as the cause of errors (Pender, 2001).  The conventional view is to emphasise protocols, 
documentation and processes as the underlying success to programme and project management 
(PPM).  Loch et al. (2006) opines that risk and its management is too front-loaded, focusing on 
the tools and techniques for risk identification and their containment through active monitoring 
and documentation such as the risk log.  Typically, risk management attempts to prevent uncer-
tain events from materialising in the first place, by offering strategies to contain their effects if 
they still occur. 
 
However, such as approach can be dangerous as Loosemore  argues: 
 
“(…) the danger is that continual advances in proactive management techniques will 
produce an over-reliance upon strategies of anticipation and deflect attention from the 
need to build resilience into organisations to deal with the unexpected.” (p. 140) 
 
There is an increasing awareness that unexpected events will happen (Hällgren and Wilson, 
2008; Söderholm, 2008; Sun and Meng, 2008).  With Perrow, we argue that it is not a question 
of „if‟ but „when‟ unexpected events will emerge.  In Perrow (1994)‟s words, 
“no matter how hard we try there will be serious accidents because of the interactive 
complexity (which allows the inevitable error to interact in unexpected ways and defeat 
safety systems) and tight coupling (in which small error propagate into major ones) of 
most risky systems”. (p. 212) 
 
Little help can be found in the project management literature on how individuals respond to un-
expected events.  Unlike the literature in general management, there are only a few empirical 
studies dedicated to preparing for and responding to such events.  Exceptions can be found in 
studies mainly on crisis management in the construction industry (Hällgren and Wilson, 2008; 
Loosemore, 1998a; b; Söderholm, 2008).  Loosemore (1998a; b) studied practitioners‟ behav-
iours in a crisis and identified „ironies‟ in which important aspects such as mutual trust are 
threatened or missing exactly in moments of crisis.  Hällgren and Wilson (2008) and Söderholm 
(2008) examine the practices used by project managers to cope with unexpected events, in a 
similar line as the practice approach developed in sociology and philosophy (e.g. Jarzabkowski 
and Spee, 2009; Schatzki, 1996). 
 
There is also a lack of studies exploring the link between practices and success.  This paper aims 
to contribute to this gap by examining practitioners‟ perceptions of how successfully they re-
sponded to unexpected events.  Building on the „ironies‟ identified by Loosemore (1998b), we 
explored the enabling conditions that will support project managers‟ ability to cope with unex-
pected events.  That is, what organisational foundations are relevant to respond to unexpected 
events successfully? 
 
We explored three elements: (1) the event, (2) the response and (3) perceived success.  Three 
questions were asked, respectively: “what happened?”, “what did project and programme man-
agers do when faced with an unexpected event?” and “how did successful responses differ from 
unsuccessful ones from the perspective of the practitioner?”  The first two questions provided us 
with a context of the change and participants‟ reactions when faced with an unexpected occur-
rence.  The study is centred on the third question.  We have deliberately located our research on 
perceived success of response rather than the overall success of the project for two reasons.  
Firstly, the overall project success is influenced by several other factors that we would not be 
able to control for.  Secondly, we aim to understand success as seen from the viewpoint of pro-
ject personnel faced with an unexpected event.  We believe that our study is amongst the firsts to 
examine response success to unexpected events.  We compare and contrast successful and un-
successful responses to shed light on successful practices.  
 
2 Literature review 
 
Importance of unexpected events and their response 
A project is a „vehicle of change‟ including a defined scope which needs to be delivered in a de-
fined time and at an agreed cost (e.g. APM, 2006).  Projects are characterised by, among others, 
its uniqueness and inherent uncertainty; each differing from the other in some respect (e.g. APM, 
2006; Maylor, 2005; PMBoK, 2004).  Given project management‟s scientific management incli-
nation, it is not surprising that systematic responses have been developed in the form of risk 
management standards to provide order and predictability (Chapman and Ward, 2002; Ward and 
Chapman, 2002a; b).  Hence, the purpose of risk management is to assess and manage uncer-
tainty in advance - to define responses  to risks that may have a future adverse impact on the pro-
ject outcome before they materialise (Chapman and Ward, 2002).  Invariably, risk management 
is reliant on hindsight as a predicator for future risk events.  
 
Although risk management seeks to identify much of the variations and provide for their mitiga-
tion, it is simply impossible to totally de-risk a project.  De Meyer et al (2002) claim that projects 
face a continuum of unexpected change varying from simple variations (or aleatory uncertainty) 
to chaos (or epistemic uncertainty), as shown in the left side of Figure 1.  On the one side sits 
aleatory uncertainty which refers to chance and describes a random process.  Throwing a dice 
often enough enables a decision maker to define outcome probabilities of one side of the dice 
showing up.  We are uncertain about the number we will receive, but we are sure that each of the 
numbers will occur with a probability.  The distribution of probabilities (chance) would not 
change unless the dice itself would change its shape.  Changing its shape, the dice would have to 
be thrown repeatedly in order to generate knowledge about the new distribution of chances.  
Hence simple variations in a well-defined and planned project, such as rain in the British Au-
tumn can ground a construction project to a halt.  Alternatively, the project team may forget a 
detail, make wrong calculations, etc; or, as the expected utility theory claims, they may decide 
that the benefit  realised by avoiding the risk is lower than the effort or cost necessary to avoid it 
(Arrow, 1983; Borge, 2001; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
 
On the other end of the continuum, „chaos‟ is involved in exploratory projects, such as the devel-
opment of new drugs in the combat of a disease.  This extreme faces epistemic uncertainty.  
Epistemic uncertainty results from gaps in knowledge.  For example, one may be uncertain of an 
outcome because one has never used a particular technology before.  In many contexts, managers 
remain ignorant.  Aleatory and, in particular, epistemic uncertainty, demand that we have to try 
and make sense of incidents when they happen as unexpected events.  Uncertainty in projects 
means that managers‟ predictions such as the probabilistic conclusions about future risk are only 
„best guesses‟ and cannot be relied on unquestioningly (Frosdick, 1997; Pender, 2001).  
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Figure 1: Focus of the Research 
 
 
Unexpected events: What are they? 
Notwithstanding project managers‟ efforts to predict all possible risks in projects, there are al-
ways residual uncertainties (as illustrated in Figure 1).  Unexpected events for the purpose of this 
study are the outcome of a range of residual uncertainties that can threaten the viability of a pro-
ject (see Figure 2)  
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Figure 2: Differentiating aspects of unexpected events 
Literature often refers to unexpected events as low probability, high impact situations.  Yet, this 
does not necessarily mean that the event is purely unforeseeable or unknown (Pich et al., 2002).  
Recent research has highlighted the aspect of attention; managers concentrating on some features 
of the environment to the (relative) exclusion of others (Weick, 1995).  In general, they learn to 
concentrate on what is critical in their experience with the domain at hand and disregard any 
other events.  Reasons for the lack of attention are manifold but the cognitive exclusion of these 
possible events creates the effect of a surprise.  Despite being knowledgeable about the risks in a 
project, they elect to shelve some under the rationale, „it will not happen to me‟.  For example, 
public and relevant statistics are available to help us make a reasonable judgement about the like-
lihood of been injured in a car accident.  Having subconsciously decided that „it will not happen 
to me‟, we continue to drive our cars.  Therefore, when an actual car accident occurs, we are sur-
prised because the actual threat was not conceived pertinent at the given point in time.   
 
Although the probabilistic, normative „management by planning‟ approaches such as risk man-
agement suggest that uncertainty can be well planned in advance, we have incomplete knowl-
edge about how projects will unfold (Pender, 2001). It is inevitable that unanticipated events will 
occur in projects, requiring a time-pressured response (Hällgren and Wilson, 2008; Loosemore, 
2000) and calling for a „management by organising‟ project management paradigm (Williams, 
2005).  As responding to unexpected events is a fundamental function in project management, 
participants in this study were asked to think of examples of „significant unforeseeable events‟ 
which took the project manager and his team „by surprise‟, whether these were effectively un-
known, unpredicted or merely residual risks that materialised. 
 
Responding to unexpected events and the impact on success 
Studies especially within crisis management explored a) individual, b) group and c) organisa-
tional responses to unexpected events.  These are summarised in Table 1. 
 
Individual behaviours in a crisis are widely researched, especially within psychological research.  
Many of the studies were looking at how people behaved when faced with catastrophic events 
such as Tsunamis, earthquakes or war.  In the organisational context, researchers conclude that 
“cognitive limitations are inherent in individuals and that organization-based solutions constitute 
the primary method for overcoming or minimising these limitations” (Pearson and Clair, 1998). 
 
Responses at the group level encompass practices based on interactions among stakeholders in-
ternally and externally, such as negotiations.  The majority of studies in the project management 
literature are located at this level.  Organisational level responses regard broader activities and 
organisational culture in preparing individuals to cope with unexpected events as they material-
ise.  Some organisations are well equipped able to cope with unexpected events while responses 
from others can worsen the situation (Carmeli and Halevi, 2009).  Commentators debate on the 
„best‟ way to respond to a crisis but lack empirical validation.  Empirical studies in the project 
management context identified responses that took place in companies but did not evaluate 
whether these were perceived as successful or not (see Table 1).  The scant attention on individ-
ual perspective of responses to unexpected events prompts this project.  
Table 1: Literature on practices related to unexpected events 
 
Focus Source Methodology Responses 
P
ro
je
ct
 c
o
n
te
x
t 
Individual 
and group 
level 
Loosemore 
(1998a) 
Case studies in construc-
tion projects 
Preconceived beliefs and attitudes, level of uncertainty surrounding financial responsibility 
and pressure  
Loosemore 
(1998b) 
Case studies in construc-
tion projects 
Necessity but usual lack of team work and collective responsibility, effective communication 
and mutual sensitivity between project members 
Group and 
organisatio-
nal level 
Söderholm 
(2008) 
Four case studies of dif-
ferent project types in 
different industries 
Most used practices were: Detaching strategies, setting up intensive meeting schedules and 
negotiating project conditions 
Engwall and 
Svensson (2001; 
2004) 
Three case studies in 
product development 
projects 
Cheetah organisations: Abrupt emergence of ad hoc organisations composed to solve unex-
pected problems. They are explicitly sanctioned, have full-time members, are action-oriented 
 accomplish a specific mission, and are smaller and more time limited than usual temporary 
organisations (the duration varies from 3 to 8 weeks). 
Hällgren and 
Wilson (2008) 
15 crises in construction Remedies draw on internal as well as external sources of expertise, intensive communication 
and both formal and informal practices. Practices included mainly negotiations with client 
and subcontractors and re-planning and re-organising – including overtime and re-work 
Nikander and 
Eloranta (2001) 
Interviews and case stud-
ies in construction pro-
jects 
Complementing traditional project management planning with attention to early warning 
signals. 68 types of early warnings including gut feelings, conflicts, indecision. 
Pavlak (2004) Conceptual with exam-
ples based on case stud-
ies 
Troubleshooting through creative problem solving in “tiger teams” – high performance 
teams solving problems based on uninhibited constructive conflict 
G
en
er
al
 m
an
ag
em
en
t 
Individual 
and group 
level 
Many studies in psychology, for example defensive mechanisms: shock, defensive, acknowledgement, adaptation (Fink et al., 1971), limited 
information processing capabilities, tendency for irrational and biased responses, shattered assumptions, victimisation (summarised by Pear-
son and Clair, 1998), threat rigidity theory - individuals, groups and organisations behave rigidly in threatening crisis situations (Chat-
topadhyay et al., 2001; George et al., 2006; Meszaros, 1999; Starbuck and Milliken, 1988; Staw et al., 1981) 
Group level Improvisation Improvisation can be defined as “the conception of action as it unfolds, by an organization and/or its members, drawing 
on available material. Cognitive, affective and social resources” (Pina e Cunha et al., 1999). Often conceptualised around 
the Jazz metaphor, this concept had its peak in the 1990s and was considered a way to deal with unexpected events in 
situations such as meetings.  
Organisa-
tional level 
Prone to pre-
pared 
Preparation to crisis developing an organisation from crisis prone to crisis prepared through identifying types of crisis, 
regarding early warnings, construct systems that enable, for example, facing faulty rationalisations and engaging with 
stakeholders (Pearson and Mitroff, 1993). 
Resilience An organisation that can adapt to and respond to crisis and develop from crisis to success (e.g. Hamel and Valikangas, 
2003; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001) 
3 Research design 
An adapted Repertory Grid (RepGrid) method was used to explore the unexpected event and 
their respective responses, which together form the unit of analysis of this study.  RepGrid be-
longs to the family of cognitive mapping tools.  Despite the name, the proposition that cognitive 
mapping is able to predict behavior is arguably flawed as it ignores the role of emotion (Eden, 
1992).  The process of articulating cognition in itself instigates reflection that can influence ac-
tion.  However it is reasonable to argue that  
 
“[cognitive mapping] may represent subjective data more meaningfully than other mod-
els and so have utility for researchers interested in subjective knowledge.” (Eden, 1992, 
p. 262).  
 
This fits well with the goal of the present study as it facilitates the process of unfolding the dif-
ferences between a successful and unsuccessful response to unexpected events from the perspec-
tive of project or programme manager. 
 
RepGrid is widely applied in IS research as summarised by Tan and Hunter (2002) and has 
gained some attention lately in project management research (Baloi and Price, 2003; Napier et 
al., 2009).  This method was developed by Kelly (1955) in psychological studies in the 1950‟s.  
It is based on the identification of characteristics (or “constructs”) by comparing and contrasting 
different elements, in this study, responses to unexpected events.  Goffin (2002) applies this 
technique to management research and suggests that the method is adequate to articulate percep-
tions about complex issues, so that explanations go beyond jargon, and new insights are likely to 
emerge.  Brown (1992) compared several cognitive mapping methods and RepGrid was posi-
tively evaluated for its truthfulness and value-tapping capacity, but criticized it mainly for its de-
pendence on investigators‟ skills and ease to use.  The criticisms were evident in our pilot study, 
in particular as regards the number of comparative elements.  In order to facilitate the process 
and overcome both criticisms, we adapted the method by limiting comparative elements to two 
instead of at least three (details as below). 
 
Data collection 
Data collection followed three steps.  The data collection instrument containing instructions on 
the use of the RepGrid was first piloted with six participants who tested it for clarity, adequacy 
and methodological rigor.  Two were practitioners with over five years of experience in project 
management; two were academics with no experience in project management, but with experi-
ence in using the RepGrid method, and the remaining two participants had no experience in 
management or research.  A significant feedback was that participants unfamiliar with the Rep-
Grid method found it difficult and confusing to compare three or more types of events.  They 
struggled to distinguish the events, what happened in each of them and assess their own response 
at the same time.  We started the pilot considering five unexpected events and concluded with 
only two.  As we were researching participants who are practising managers, we took the deci-
sion to avoid academic jargon. Instead, we used common language nomenclatures in the research 
instrument.  For example, calling „constructs‟, characteristics instead.  Finally, it was decided 
that the instrument should be viewed and used by both participant and moderator.  This improved 
discussions, promoted shared understanding and increased face validity of the study. 
 
The instrument comprised a table with four columns along the lines of a repertory grid: 
 Characteristics (constructs, in academic terms): the process was triggered by the question 
“what makes the response to the event A different to the response to event B?”  The an-
swer to this question was written down in the first column, the constructs.  As each of 
these emerged, the moderator explored what they really meant, so that the constructs 
were described adequately, avoiding misunderstandings. 
 Poles: here the participants described what they considered to be extreme success and 
failure for each of the constructs described in the first column.  This not only enhanced 
understanding in what was meant by each of the constructs but also provided us with a 
scale for each construct. 
 Rating for event A and B: based on the scale produced in the second column, responses 
to events A and B are than rated from 1 (extremely successful) to 5 (extremely unsuc-
cessful). 
 
22 experienced project managers from defence and defence-related organisations agreed to par-
ticipate in the study.  Eight are military officers involved in a number of transformation and 
equipment acquisition projects.  Five are Ministry of Defence (MOD) civilian managers working 
on projects in the MOD‟s Integrated Project Teams (IPTs).  Nine are project managers from the 
private sector.  We started by explaining the goals of the research and the interview process (how 
repertory grid works, including a demonstration of how the process unfolds). Then we asked the 
participant to choose responses to two comparable significant but not related unexpected events 
(event A and B) that happened in their projects.  One response was to be perceived by them to be 
successful and the other to be unsuccessful.  The events and their respective responses were 
briefly described in written form.  The second step comprised the repertory grid process per se.  
The responses to events A and B were compared and reported in written form through the in-
strument.  The responses to events A and B were compared through a dialogue between the indi-
vidual project or programme manager and a moderator.  The moderator led the research exercise, 
and instigated the identification of different characteristics (constructs) and their underlining 
meaning.  These were reported in written form on the instrument. 
 
The process continued until the participants could not identify further constructs.  The repertory 
grids had from one to six constructs.  The majority (12 participants) identified two constructs.  A 
total of 52 constructs were identified, and respondents took around 30 to 45 minutes to undertake 
the entire process. 
 
Analysing the data 
The data analysis followed three steps undertaken by the three researchers involved in the study.  
Firstly, we discussed each event and coded it according to the nature of what impacted the pro-
ject/programme.  We strived to avoid a typology of risk events, but rather to derive an overview 
of what happened in each event.  The types emerged inductively.  The process was interactive 
and the events were revisited by the researchers until there was a consensus on the types and 
their classifications.   
 
We then followed the same process for the responses to these events.  Here the focus was on 
what successful responses had that were lacking in unsuccessful responses, and what unsuccess-
ful responses had that were not present in successful responses.  During this process, the con-
structs proposed in the repertory grid were grouped around six types of responses. 
 
Finally, we evaluated the internal validity of the data by checking whether the successful re-
sponses were also considered more successful than the unsuccessful responses when using the 
six constructs identified in the research.  The validity was confirmed. 
 
4 Empirical Results 
Seven different categories emerged from the 44 unexpected events analysed, namely technical 
issues, sponsor withdrawing support, external events, resource change or constraint, human be-
haviour and project scope.   
 
Table 2 shows the number of responses to unexpected events that had successful and unsuccess-
ful responses according to the type of event.  The total number of events of each type varied 
from six to nine and consequently there was no type of event that was mentioned significantly 
more often than others.  There were also a symmetric number of examples of successful and un-
successful responses for each type of event.  For example, we had three technical issues dealt 
with successfully and three unsuccessfully.  Human behaviour was the only exception, and was 
more often associated with failure than success.  This provided us with enough empirical data to 
discuss each of the types.   
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Types of events 
 Success-
ful 
Unsuc-
cessful 
 Example Total 
Technical issues (TI) 3 3 Unexpected insufficient per-
formance of a technical system 
6 
Sponsor withdrawing support (SS) 3 3 Project dismissed in senior man-
agement meeting 
6 
Externalities (external events out of 
influence of project) (EU) 
4 4 War in an Latin American coun-
try 
8 
Resource change and constraints 
(RC) 
5 4 Key resource pulled off to work 
on other projects 
9 
Human behaviour – disregarding 
rules and protocols (HB) 
1 5 War protocol was neglected 6 
Project scoping issues (PS) 6 3 Major changes in scope 9 
 
 
Table 3 provides an overview of the six constructs that characterised the responses and which 
represented the differences between successful and unsuccessful responses.  The table also indi-
cates the number of times each of the constructs was mentioned by participants.  Stakeholder en-
gagement was mentioned by all the participants, followed by authority and capability of the team 
and flexibility of processes to respond to events.  One could be tempted to link the types of 
events and these constructs but this would encourage misleading interpretations as the constructs 
were identified in the comparison between two disassociated events that were usually of a differ-
ent type, and therefore the constructs cannot be attributed to a specific type of event. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Characteristics and examples of successful responses 
Constructs Examples of successful responses No. of times mentioned 
A. Stakeholders’ engage-
ment 
Negotiation of scope with client, reorganise stakeholders 
perception of risk 22 
B. Capability of leader 
and team 
Trained team, „they know what they are doing‟ 
19 
C. Processes Flexibility, no micro planning, contingency plan, control 
over decisions and resources 14 
D. Behaviour Avoidance of panic and overreaction 8 
E. Communication Availability and communication of information, ac-
knowledge concerns of the team 8 
F. Timing High speed of approval process, good sense of urgency 8 
 
 
5 Findings 
Of interest is the difficulty of some of the participants to identify the truly „unknown-unknowns‟.  
They explained that it was difficult to recall events that had significant impact on their projects 
and were not identified and usually also part of the risk log.  In other words, the events were 
“known-unknowns” rather than “unknown-unknowns”.  Known-unknowns are circumstances, 
outcomes or events that actors  have identified as possibly existing, but do not know whether 
they will take place or not.  Unknown-unknowns are those circumstances, events, outcomes that 
were not identified in the first place.  
 
The ability to identify many possible risks reflects the experience of the participants as project 
and programme managers and the embeddedness of risk identification as an organisational rou-
tine.  However, it also implies that identification may be relevant but it is not „the‟ answer to un-
certainty.  Although some of the events analysed were predicted, not all of them had successful 
responses, prompting the question “is success in responding to unexpected events a matter of 
luck?”  In the next sections, we will discuss how project managers created their own luck and 
increased the success of their responses to unexpected events.  
 
The three pillars 
The six constructs identified in the RepGrid (Table 3) followed intuitively in the three domains 
of organisational responses distinguished in the literature: organisational, group and individual.  
They indicated that successful responses to unexpected events were organic and based on three 
pillars: a responsive and functioning structure at the organisational level, interpersonal relation-
ship at the group level and competent people at the individual level.  Figure 3 portrays these pil-
lars and respective constructs.  In the next sections, each pillar is discussed in detail. 
 
Successful Response to Unexpected Events
Organisational level
Responsive and functioning 
structure
• High degree of freedom (C)
• Pace to make and implement 
decisions (F)
Individual level
Competent people
• Competence of leader and team 
(B)
• Behaviour, including self-
awareness and ability to deal 
with stressful situation (D)
Group level
Good interpersonal relationship
• Engagement with stakeholders, 
including ability to negotiate 
solutions (A)
• Communication, including 
availability of information as 
well as its communication (E)
 
Figure 3: Three Pillars to Successful Response to Unexpected Events 
 
Responsive and functioning structure 
Not surprisingly, the results indicate that the ability of organisations to respond to changes ap-
propriately and quickly was present in successful responses but lacking in unsuccessful re-
sponses to unexpected events.  This ability was mentioned by the majority of participants in 
terms of explicit management practices such as rapid decision making and implementation of 
these decisions.  Successful responses characterised by top management involvement, provided 
projects managers the necessary political support to act quickly and accordingly.  A sense of ur-
gency and access availability to resources were perceived as success factors by, for example, a 
project team responsible for investigating and coping with an aircraft accident.  The agility in 
scrambling a team to investigate the causes of the accident enabled quick and decisive processes, 
and the consequent solution of the issue with limited negative implications.  The people available 
were not professionally trained, but the project manager was able to bridge the knowledge gap 
more efficiently in that situation than if a sufficiently trained team were in place, but delayed, as 
it was the case in the unsuccessful project used for comparison. 
 
We termed this ability „responsive organisation‟ after the definition proposed by Bernardes and 
Hanna (2009).  The authors offer a distinction between flexibility, agility and responsiveness – 
often used interchangeably: flexibility is the ability to change within existing or pre-established 
parameters, agility relates to the ability to rapidly reconfigure within new parameters, and re-
sponsiveness refers to the purposeful and timely response to change.  Based on this distinction, it 
is appropriate to term the organisation ability described as responsiveness. 
 
Apart from being responsive, another relevant characteristic identified was empowerment.  Par-
ticipants as managers were allowed to decide what responses should be undertaken, how to do 
them, the choice of resources deemed necessary for their budget, and so on.  This concept ap-
proximates that of situated action (Suchman, 1987), which is based on the premise that people 
involved in the specific situation are most able to judge what needs to be done, how to do it, etc. 
Suchman advocates the shifting of responsibility and authority to the key people in each specific 
situation.  
 
While successful responses were characterised by a high degree of freedom, unsuccessful re-
sponses exposed micro-management and excessive control by higher hierarchical levels within 
the project.  Respondents  explained that much time was spent justifying what should be done, 
and reporting what was done (up to a daily report), leaving little time to actually undertake the 
actions to put the project or programme back on track.  For example, in a project to assist the 
transition to independence in an African country, resource requests were slow and some times 
had to be submitted several times.  This severely hindered the ability to response to the unex-
pected event successfully.  
 
Some unsuccessful responses also suggested the relevance of functioning structures.  Here, the 
project and programme managers mentioned that if the structure and processes are complicated 
and not working well before the event takes place, a good response is even more challenging.  As 
reported by one of the participants, B [unsuccessful event] had descended into chaos due to con-
flicting PM approaches.  Thus, successful responses rely on structures that are on one hand flexi-
ble but on the other, provide clear and simple principles and processes to manage projects. 
 
Overall, the aspects of responsive and functioning structure remind project managers that a pro-
ject should not be driven in maximum speed, considering, for example, overtime a standard prac-
tice, as unexpected event will most certainly happen, and the team needs buffer to cope with it 
successfully.  As with the Titanic, it is more difficult to see and respond to icebergs when driving 
at maximum speed. 
 
 
Good interpersonal relationships 
The second pillar is the relationships between people involved.  All respondents mentioned en-
gagement with stakeholders as key for successful responses.  This was relevant in two instances.  
 
Firstly, as expected, engagement with stakeholders played an important role in responding to un-
expected event; all participants identified this construct.  For example, in one of the unexpected 
events studied, the beneficiary raised the issue with the project team, and made sure that all sides 
involved were aligned and committed to enable enough resources to solve the problem.  It was 
clear that the management of unexpected events needs to be recognised as a priority and esca-
lated properly, and usually escalation per se is not necessarily an issue, but the type of support is.  
Some participants complained of a support system based on a top-down control, more intensive 
reporting and even daily short conversations with top management.  This kind of response from 
top management does not provide support, but rather consumes time and resource that could 
have been used to cope with the impact of the unexpected event.  Interestingly, over zealous top-
down control was more apparent in private companies than in the military or MOD integrated 
project teams. 
 
Secondly, negotiations with team members, clients and suppliers were another key characteristic 
of successful responses, lacking in unsuccessful responses.  An example was the negotiation of a 
ship survey contract with a different provider who was better able to increase the availability of 
ships necessary to cope with the unexpected event.  Similar instances have also been identified in 
other studies (Söderholm, 2008). 
 
Participants also stressed the importance of communication and the flow of information.  The 
geographical distance in some military projects particularly in times of war, requires the avail-
ability of technology to communicate.  Eight respondents stressed the relevance of availability 
and flow of information among team members, and one stressed the ability to listen and ac-
knowledge the concerns of the team.  
 
 
Competent people 
The third pillar relates to competent people.  Almost all respondents stressed the importance of 
people along lines similar to these listed below: 
 
team and leader “knew what they were doing” 
“having resource available with the right skills” 
“providing the right resource in a timely manner” 
“have cohesive teamwork” 
 
Being able to trust the judgement of colleagues and their ability to resolve the situation also 
emerged as important.  One participant described the benefits of clear leadership to provide a 
new direction after an unexpected event. 
 Another aspect mentioned by several participants was the ability of managers to control their 
emotions in stressful situations.  Events where people „do not panic‟ resulted in successful re-
sponses.  On the other hand, over-reaction was associated with unsuccessful responses.  This im-
plies that project managers with high emotional intelligence (EQ) are more likely to respond to 
unexpected events successfully.  This finding is in line with that of Müller and Turner (2007), the 
established a strong relationship between managers with high emotional intelligence (EQ) and 
project success. 
 
 
6 Organisational embeddness in response to crises  
The three pillars and their underlining concepts are closely related to other theories developed in 
general management.  We have discussed them in relation to the theories and studies reviewed in 
the literature review on responses to crises and unexpected events in project contexts.  The emer-
gence of structure, people and relation as key constructs suggest that two additional topics (not 
previously identified in the literature) – post bureaucratic organisations and improvisation - 
might have relevance for this study.  
 
The characteristics present in successful responses to unexpected events resonates some of the 
principles proposed by the post-bureaucratic organisations.  Post-bureaucratic organisations 
emerged as an ideal type of organizing that functions as the opposite of bureaucracy, where the 
hierarchic, centralized and formalized bureaucratic organization is replaced by a flat, decentral-
ized organization, emphasizing flexibility rather than rule-following (Heckscher, 1994), resem-
bling features of organic organizations (Burns and Stalker, 1961).  Today, post-bureaucratic or-
ganizations are understood as a trend, rather than a singular type, that encompasses changes ob-
served in the organizations, including the rhetoric of rapid change, globalization and competition 
in which survival depends on adaptation of organizations and flexibility, autonomy and com-
mitment of employees – termed the fast capitalist story (Gee, 1996 in Alvesson and Thompson, 
2006). 
 
Flexibility, autonomy and commitment were identified as core constructs for successful re-
sponses.  One potential area for future research would be to explore the relationship between 
post-bureaucratic organisations and the ability to respond to unexpected events.  Taken the tem-
porality of crises as suggested by (Engwall & Svensson, 2004), it could be suggested that organi-
sations approximate to post-bureaucratic principles in face of crises.  However, previous studies 
suggest that the instability created by crises lead organisations to the opposite direction, increas-
ing direct control, reducing trust and intensifying organisational politics and lack of transparency 
(Loosemore, 1998b; Söderholm, 2008).  Thus, such transformation is unlikely. 
 
What previous research on crises management in project context suggests is that post-
bureaucratic islands could be formed within organisations to respond to crises accordantly.  Cre-
ate an isolated team to cope with the crises is common, as the detaching strategies identified by 
Söderholm (2008), the „Cheetah organisations‟ proposed by Engwall and Svensson (2001), or the 
tiger teams (Pavlak, 2004).  These temporary organisations do not follow usual organisational 
modus operanti, have more access to resources, autonomy, higher levels of stress and work over-
time. 
However, the responses identified in our study were far more embedded in the current organisa-
tion, its mechanisms and available resources.  As discussed in the data analysis, the responses 
demanded top management involvement in decisions, and draw on existing relationships with 
stakeholders, available competences, current structures and processes.  If these were not func-
tioning, the responses are unlikely to be successful.  Thus, unlike previous studies, our partici-
pants did not stress the importance of the specific management action related to dealing with un-
expected events, such as detaching strategy, but rather showed that the management of such 
events is widely embedded in the current structures and its ability to respond.  As projects 
(Engwall, 2003), responses to crises within projects cannot be seen as islands.  Future research 
could further explore to what extend is the response to unexpected events are embedded in cur-
rent conditions of the project, its structure, leaders and team, and it puts forward a third preposi-
tion, that post-bureaucratic organisations are more able to respond to crises. 
 
Ability to respond is not as an island, but embedded in current forms is what has been put for-
ward in studies on improvisation and bricolage.  Pina e Cunha et al (2001) defined organisational 
improvisation as “the conception of action as it unfolds, by an organizational and/or its mem-
bers, drawing on available material, cognitive, affective and social resources” (Pina e Cunha et 
al., 1999).  Similar to studies on crisis following the „Normal Accident Theory‟ (Perrow, 1999), 
key in the discussions around improvisation is firstly the ability to act intelligently and accord-
antly in real time, when conception and actions converge to the same point in time (Moorman 
and Miner, 1998).  Second aspect of improvisation is that it draws on available resources: “if im-
provisation means responding in real time, then it immediately follows that improvisers cannot 
wait for optimal resources to be deployed and have to tackle the issues at hand with those that 
are currently available” (Pina e Cunha et al., 1999).  The reconfiguration of resources to respond 
to current challenge is termed bricolage.  This was clear in some of the responses studied, where 
rapid deployment of resources overrides the optimal set of competences for the task.   
 
 
7 The importance of the pillars 
Contrary to what we expected, the data did not indicate that some types of change were usually 
dealt with more successfully than others.  Each type of event had a similar number of successful 
and unsuccessfully responses (see Table 2). 
 
It could be argued that this symmetry is a consequence of the methodology applied in the study.  
As each participant was asked to provide an example of a successful and an unsuccessful re-
sponse to unexpected events, it is likely that they may have thought about similar types of events.  
However, a careful analysis of the data showed that this does not hold true, and the type of „event 
A‟ from each participant (dealt with successfully) was usually different than the type of „event 
B‟ (dealt with unsuccessfully).  This strengthens the argument that, at least for the 44 responses 
to unexpected events analysed, the three pillars are these that differentiate between success and 
failure, regardless of the type of event that might impact the project or programme. 
 
While all other types of event could be either managed successfully or not, human behaviour is-
sues predominantly led to failure (see Table 2).  Examples of such change were negligence of 
procedures, bypassing milestones or agreement of other parties.  
 
Human behaviour issues straddle across the three pillars.  They can hamper a „responsive and 
functioning structure‟ (pillar 1) as structures rely on people‟s competence and appropriate behav-
iour.  Inappropriate or opportunistic behaviour can also damage the second pillar (good interper-
sonal relationships).  Finally, behavioural issues can have a negative impact on pillar 3, as the 
competence of employees would be put into question.  Thus, people lay at the heart of the re-
sponse to unexpected events. 
 
Thus, the responses to unexpected events analysed suggest that improvement in project man-
agement can be achieved by better managing these three pillars.  This enables project and pro-
gramme managers to “create their own luck”, and encourages a lean approach to project and 
programme management.  The study findings indicate the need to refrain from merely adopting a 
process-based approach to predict all possible events and prescribe appropriate responses ab ini-
tio.  It was the combination of structure, people and relationships that was more likely to enable a 
successful response to an unexpected event. 
 
8 Conclusions 
No matter how good risk management processes are, projects will invariably face unexpected 
events.  The aim of this study was to identify what differentiated successful and unsuccessful re-
sponses to unexpected events from the perspective of project and programme managers.  We in-
terviewed 22 experienced project managers using Repertory Grid as a data collection method.  
 
The results indicated that structural solutions based on the creation of an isolated team to deal 
with unexpected event such as the cheetah team (Engwall and Svensson, 2001), or detaching 
strategies (Söderholm, 2008) are important, but not necessarily possible.  The examples of suc-
cessful responses were much embedded and dependent on the current organisational structures 
available to projects.  However, the heart of successful responses to unexpected responses lies 
with people assets, especially in terms of stakeholder engagement, negotiation and leadership 
skills. 
 
The research suggests that successful responses to unexpected events were built on three pillars: 
responsive and functioning structures, good interpersonal relationship and competent people.  As 
the Titanic sailed close to the unexpected iceberg, careful attention by organisations in allowing 
empowerment supported by these three pillars could have helped avoid or reduce adverse conse-
quences – that is, people can “create their own luck”. 
 
This has two important implications for current approaches to managing projects and teaching 
project management.  It suggests that linear project management approaches could usefully be 
complemented with ways to deal with unexpected events.  Just as it is time to accept the impor-
tance of people in projects, it is also vital that project personnel acknowledge that “the unex-
pected happens” and that front-end thinking alone is not going to be enough to develop success-
ful projects.  The study participants highlighted simple, responsive and functioning structures as 
a fundamental pillar of success.  Further research could explore this in greater depth and identify 
these structures in more detail by asking, “what (constructed) organisational responses would 
best support project and programme managers to react to unexpected events successfully?” and 
“how do we construct resilient organisations that are able to avoid rigidity and „chaos‟?” 
 
Secondly, the results call for further studies focusing on the behavioural aspects of project man-
agement, including how to prepare people to cope with the stress involved in unexpected events.  
Also further studies following the ideas of practice would shed light into what project and pro-
gramme managers really do to respond to such events. 
 
This research was of exploratory nature.  Further research could explore each of these pillars in 
more detail.  Case studies could observe the actual reactions to unexpected events and how pro-
ject and programme managers used these pillars in fact to enable successful responses.  Loose-
more (1998b) argued that usually exactly those factors that would have been relevant in the mo-
ment of crisis are usually lacking.  This begs the question of whether and how organisations 
could develop these pillars beforehand and still be sure they would not lose strength in the mo-
ment of need, i.e. how companies learn to be prepared for unexpected events. 
 
 
9 A reflection on study limitations 
Hindsight offers a 20:20 vision of how we could do things better.  On reflection, this has been a 
journey of discovery for the researchers as well as the participants (who as busy managers, never 
really stopped to reflect on the possible reasons for their actions and behaviours).  The motiva-
tion for the present study is the limited understanding on individual perceptions and responses to 
unexpected events in the project environment.  Its function is exploratory as there is little in the 
project literature to provide strong theoretical underpinning.  We drew on the literatures from 
sociology, psychology and management disciplines, in particular, from research on behaviours in 
crisis.  Inductive data analysis and interpretation revealed other possible explanations, especially 
the concepts of post-bureaucratic organisations and improvisation.  Hence, although the present 
study has given us an early appreciation of situated responses to unexpected events in projects 
and their evaluations as a success or failure, the findings can only be generally informative rather 
than to provide specific solutions for various ad hoc events.   
 
In our effort to delve deep into the human cognition of their actions and consequences, we opted 
for the Repertory Grid instead of straight-forward interviews.  The primary strength of the Rep-
Grid method is comparability.  As relative novices and in view of the expressed difficulty by par-
ticipants of juggling events, responses and assessments, we had to adapt the Grid for easier par-
ticipant and moderator use.  We started with five constructs but had to be content with two.  We 
accept that reducing from five to two constructs and relating the findings mostly to the crisis 
management studies, we could have constrained breadth of analysis and insights.  A small point 
in our favour is our discussion on the embeddedness of organisational practices in crisis using 
organisational theory and organisation behaviour literature.  
 
As we were working with practitioners who are unfamiliar with both the instrument and aca-
demic research, we attempted to avoid using any „jargon‟.  Arguably, this could lead to meaning 
being lost in translation, requiring explanation or clarification by the researcher (e.g. using the 
phrase „significant unforeseeable events‟ to draw out „unknowns-unknowns‟ as well as covering 
„known-unknowns‟).  Although some researchers might argue for the need to control individual 
bias and rationalising by participants, the import of the present study‟s objective of assessing 
successful and non-successful responses as seen from the eyes of the participants lies in the fact 
that perceptions underlines attitudes, emotions, and motivations.  To begin understanding how 
well people see they have responded to any unexpected event, means having to accept that bias 
and post-event rationalisation are part of the „package‟.  The strength of this research is that we 
refrained from judging participants‟ motives; instead we aimed to allow patterns to emerge.  This 
does not mean, however, that researchers‟ bias can be eradicated entirely.  
 
Our sample consisted of experienced project and programme managers who are in the defence or 
defence-related industry is sound but the split between groups could be more even.  Were we to 
run this project again, we would direct participants to think of „real‟ projects that are fully 
aligned with the standard definitions by PMI or APM of “what is a project”.  This does not mean 
that the undertakings by the military participants (or indeed the analogy with the Titanic) are 
„non-projects‟.  Each was uncertain, unique to some extent, mission driven, temporary (had to be 
performed in a timely fashion or by a set date) and involved clear outcome deliveries.  The main 
departure for the military is that money or budget is the least of the three primary constraints as 
achieving the mission is the key imperative.  Planning and scheduling are important activities for 
military project managers as in the project to help an African nation transit to democratic gov-
ernance.  Likewise, the design and build of the Titanic was a major project even by present-day 
terms.   
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The Titanic sunk, so what? 
Project manager response to unexpected events 
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Abstract 
Projects are inherently uncertain and face unexpected events, from small changes in 
scope to unforeseen client’s bankruptcy.  This paper studies how project managers re-
spond to such events and how successful and unsuccessful responses differ from the 
perspective of the practitioner.  We analysed 44 unexpected events faced by 22 experi-
enced project managers in defence and defence-related organisations.  The project 
managers compared two unexpected events that they faced, one that they considered 
the response successful and the other, unsuccessful.  We identified three pillars sup-
porting successful responses to unexpected events: (1) responsive and functioning 
structure at the organizational level, (2) good interpersonal relationship at the group 
level and (3) competent people at the individual level.  The events and respective re-
sponses analysed suggest that improvement in project management can be achieved by 
better managing these three pillars, allowing project and programme managers to “cre-
ate their own luck”. 
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Figure 2: Differentiating aspects of unexpected events 
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Table 1: Literature on practices related to unexpected events 
 
Focus Source Methodology Responses 
P
ro
je
ct
 c
o
n
te
x
t 
Individual 
and group 
level 
Loosemore 
(1998a) 
Case studies in construc-
tion projects 
Preconceived beliefs and attitudes, level of uncertainty surrounding financial responsibility 
and pressure  
Loosemore 
(1998b) 
Case studies in construc-
tion projects 
Necessity but usual lack of team work and collective responsibility, effective communica-
tion and mutual sensitivity between project members 
Group and 
organisatio-
nal level 
Söderholm 
(2008) 
Four case studies of dif-
ferent project types in 
different industries 
Most used practices were: Detaching strategies, setting up intensive meeting schedules and 
negotiating project conditions 
Engwall and 
Svensson 
(2001; 2004) 
Three case studies in 
product development 
projects 
Cheetah organisations: Abrupt emergence of ad hoc organisations composed to solve un-
expected problems. They are explicitly sanctioned, have full-time members, are action-
oriented  accomplish a specific mission, and are smaller and more time limited than usual 
temporary organisations (the duration varies from 3 to 8 weeks). 
Hällgren and 
Wilson (2008) 
15 crises in construction Remedies draw on internal as well as external sources of expertise, intensive communica-
tion and both formal and informal practices. Practices included mainly negotiations with 
client and subcontractors and re-planning and re-organising – including overtime and re-
work 
Nikander and 
Eloranta (2001) 
Interviews and case 
studies in construction 
projects 
Complementing traditional project management planning with attention to early warning 
signals. 68 types of early warnings including gut feelings, conflicts, indecision. 
Pavlak (2004) Conceptual with exam-
ples based on case stud-
ies 
Troubleshooting through creative problem solving in “tiger teams” – high performance 
teams solving problems based on uninhibited constructive conflict 
G
en
er
al
 m
an
ag
e-
m
en
t 
Individual 
and group 
level 
Many studies in psychology, for example defensive mechanisms: shock, defensive, acknowledgement, adaptation (Fink et al., 1971), lim-
ited information processing capabilities, tendency for irrational and biased responses, shattered assumptions, victimisation (summarised 
by Pearson and Clair, 1998), threat rigidity theory - individuals, groups and organisations behave rigidly in threatening crisis situations 
(Chattopadhyay et al., 2001; George et al., 2006; Meszaros, 1999; Starbuck and Milliken, 1988; Staw et al., 1981) 
Group level Improvisation Improvisation can be defined as “the conception of action as it unfolds, by an organization and/or its members, draw-
ing on available material. Cognitive, affective and social resources” (Pina e Cunha et al., 1999). Often conceptualised 
around the Jazz metaphor, this concept had its peak in the 1990s and was considered a way to deal with unexpected 
events in situations such as meetings.  
Organisa-
tional level 
Prone to pre-
pared 
Preparation to crisis developing an organisation from crisis prone to crisis prepared through identifying types of crisis, 
regarding early warnings, construct systems that enable, for example, facing faulty rationalisations and engaging with 
stakeholders (Pearson and Mitroff, 1993). 
Resilience An organisation that can adapt to and respond to crisis and develop from crisis to success (e.g. Hamel and Valikangas, 
2003; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001) 
 Table 2: Types of events 
 Success-
ful 
Unsuc-
cessful 
 Example Total 
Technical issues (TI) 3 3 Unexpected insufficient per-
formance of a technical system 
6 
Sponsor withdrawing support (SS) 3 3 Project dismissed in senior man-
agement meeting 
6 
Externalities (external events out of 
influence of project) (EU) 
4 4 War in an Latin American coun-
try 
8 
Resource change and constraints 
(RC) 
5 4 Key resource pulled off to work 
on other projects 
9 
Human behaviour – disregarding 
rules and protocols (HB) 
1 5 War protocol was neglected 6 
Project scoping issues (PS) 6 3 Major changes in scope 9 
 
 
Table 3: Characteristics and examples of successful responses 
Constructs Examples of successful responses No. of times mentioned 
A. Stakeholders’ en-
gagement 
Negotiation of scope with client, reorganise stake-
holders perception of risk 22 
B. Capability of leader 
and team 
Trained team, „they know what they are doing‟ 
19 
C. Processes Flexibility, no micro planning, contingency plan, 
control over decisions and resources 14 
D. Behaviour Avoidance of panic and overreaction 8 
E. Communication Availability and communication of information, 
acknowledge concerns of the team 8 
F. Timing High speed of approval process, good sense of ur-
gency 8 
 
 
